Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 64

Issue 2

Article 3

2013

In Memorian: Edward A. Mearns, Jr.
Melvyn R. Durchslag

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Melvyn R. Durchslag, In Memorian: Edward A. Mearns, Jr., 64 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 304 (2013)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol64/iss2/3

This In Memoriam is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 2·2013
In Memoriam: Professor Edward A. Mearns, Jr.

Melvyn R. Durchslag†
As my mentor, Edward A. (“Ted”) Mearns taught me how to
teach constitutional law. (For those of you who are my former
students, you can blame Ted, not me.) Actually, I overstate it. He
didn’t teach me how to master the art of classroom antics; I could not
come close to imitating him in that regard. Nor did he teach me how
to do the Socratic method. That was all my doing, or undoing, as the
case may be. No, he taught me far more important things.
Ted taught me how to read a constitutional case. You would
expect I learned that skill in law school, but I didn’t, not really. But
if not in school, I thought I certainly learned this skill over my several
years of researching and litigating constitutional cases as a practicing
lawyer. But I didn’t, at least not the way Ted read constitutional law
cases. First, and maybe most importantly, Ted taught me how and
why everything in constitutional law is interconnected, something you
never appreciate as a student, a practitioner, or a litigator. As he used
to say, you push the balloon in one spot and a bump appears in
another place altogether. Students rarely appreciate this. And
litigators generally don’t care because their only goal is winning the
case at hand.
Ted also taught me how to look for the nuances, the linguistic
expressions of the Justices, their phraseology, and the structure of
their opinions. These help reveal what was really going on in the case.
Because for Ted, constitutional law was not an abstraction. It was not
simply, or even primarily, an exploration and study of ideas and often
conflicting ideologies. It was about people who cared deeply and
passionately about an outcome that impacted someone’s life in a
profound way. After all, William Marbury couldn’t have cared less
whether it was “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to [s]ay what the law is.”1 Marbury was an angry and
disappointed man, and it was that anger and disappointment which
led to the case that to this day defines the judicial role in our
constitutional scheme. Ted brought that home to me.
In addition, Ted taught me the importance of concurring and
dissenting opinions, not for the voyeuristic reasons we all seem
fascinated by, but because concurring opinions are often the road map
to the next case the Court will hear. And dissenting opinions often
become the majority’s view, as Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and, more
recently (and to my mind, unfortunately), Thomas can so well attest.
It may take decades or only a few years before that occurs, but one
who teaches constitutional law must be able to convey not only a
sense of our constitutional history but of its future direction as well.
†

Professor of Law Emeritus, Case Western Reserve University.

1.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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As both a constitutional historian and a constitutional prognosticator,
Ted was not only good; he was profound.
But more than anything else Ted taught me how to “do”
constitutional law. What that means precisely, I’m not sure. Maybe
Justice Stewart best described it with his oft quoted quip in Jacobellis
v. Ohio.2 But whatever it means, Ted “did” constitutional law. He
lived and breathed the subject. His analogous world was that of
constitutional law. It was part and parcel of the way he thought, not
only about law but about life as well. To him, constitutional law was
an extension of his devout Catholic faith. To Ted, constitutional law
was law’s moral compass. It guided and ordered civil society and set
the goals and aspirations of human interaction.
Moreover the ambiguity of constitutional law, its famous or
infamous incoherence, and its seeming political dimensions never
seemed to trouble him much. He told me a story when I first started
teaching constitutional law, a story I have carried with me ever since.
It is about an astronomer’s conference, kind of like the Association of
American Law Schools’ annual meeting of pontificators. There was, as
there always is, a main speaker who was at the podium expounding
on some new and unique—and somewhat off the wall—astrophysical
explanation of the origin of the universe. In the audience, one
astronomer turned to his neighbor and said, “Here goes old Fred
again. Don’t pay any attention to him. I was in graduate school with
Fred, and all he did was sit on the quad lawn at night looking up at
the stars, probably smoking a bit of the wacky weed, writing love
poems to his girlfriend du jour. He was a flake then, and it appears he
hasn’t progressed much since those days.”
The punch line of Ted’s story is that Fred may or may not be the
world’s greatest flake. In the final analysis, however, Fred’s theory of
the origin of the universe is either right or it is wrong, and whether
Fred is a flake or not has nothing to do with that essential
proposition. It is the job of the constitutional scholar, Ted said, to
seek, for example, whether Justice Scalia or Justice Souter has the
better constitutional argument. And in doing so, she must ignore the
fact that one Justice’s general view of our constitutional order is more
“conservative” or more “liberal” than another’s. Moreover, the truth
doesn’t lie in whether the scholar aligns herself more closely with one
Justice’s judicial or political philosophy than another’s. The answer
must lie in some objective analysis that transcends any particular
political or judicial philosophy. Like Fred’s goofy theory of the origin
2.

378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). The exact wording of the
famous, or infamous as the case may be, quote is: “I shall not today
attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description [i.e., obscenity]; and
perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it
when I see it . . . .” Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
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of the universe, whatever his political philosophy, Justice Scalia is
either more correct or less correct than the Justices with whom he
disagrees.
I concede that this sounds more than just a bit quaint in today’s
world, even in today’s world of scholarship. But when you think
about it, to view constitutional law, or law in any of its dimensions,
in any other way can only render one hopeless to do anything but be
a constant critic. One can never become an agent of change through
rational dialogue without the ability to pick apart a legal argument or
conclusion on its own terms without reference to the individual
making the argument or propounding the theory. To do that is hard
work, far harder than expounding a political or constitutional
philosophy and finding some Supreme Court language to support your
view. Ted was willing to do that hard work; it was part, indeed the
essence, of his makeup. That, in large part, made Ted a star—in the
classrooms of Virginia, Northwestern, and Case Western Reserve; as
captain of the cross country team at Yale University; and more
generally in life itself.
Most of my remarks have chronicled my memories of Ted in our
professional interactions. But I don’t want to leave anyone with the
impression that Ted was all work or that Ted’s only importance in
my life was as a mentor who shaped my professional development. He
certainly was that, but above all he was my friend. And friendship,
and what friendship means, is extraordinarily difficult to put into
words. So I will just say that I treasured being with him, and I am
thankful that Bob Lawry and I were able to dine with him on several
occasions in his final days. I don’t know what he knew about his
prognosis, but he never let on that he either knew or was overly
concerned. “Oh the doctors are going to try this or that and
everything is going to be fine,” Ted would say. He was always upbeat
and on the road to recovery.
But maybe his most endearing and enduring quality was his
selflessness. It was that which made Ted a true and valued friend and
devoted husband. Indeed, Ted literally sacrificed everything, including
his own health, to care for the love of his life, Pat, a truly remarkable
woman in her own right.
I personally don’t believe in an afterlife, either physical or
spiritual. But maybe for the first time in my life, I hope, for Ted’s
sake, that my belief or lack thereof is wrong. For if anyone deserves a
special place in heaven, it is my friend and mentor, Ted Mearns.
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